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BUILDING FENCES TOGETHER: THE
EU's LESSONS FOR THE U.S.-CANADA
PERIMETER SECURITY PLAN
Note
By: Matthew K. Grashoff
ABSTRACT

After the events of September 11, 2001, the United States and
Canada enacted policies aimed at increasing the effectiveness of joint
security measures between the two countries. The latest joint security
policy, calling for unprecedented integration of U.S. and Canadian
security apparatuses, is known as the "perimeter security" plan. On
December 7, 2011, the U.S. and Canadian governments released a
Joint Action Plan plotting a path toward this further integration of
the two countries' national security policies. However, there are a
number of concerns regarding the various facets of the plan. Is it
advisable to integrate national security functions? What do the
countries stand to gain by integrating? Most importantly, can
integration work?
The

example of the European Union's

common foreign

and

security policy indicates that regional security partnerships can indeed
work. Analysis of the development of the European Union's policy
identifies the crucial areas where security partners must collaborate.
Application of the lessons learned from the European Union's
experience will enable the United States and Canada to adroitly
navigate the complications of integrating their security policies. The
analysis and application of these lessons should lead to a strong and
stable security perimeter that will serve the interests of both
countries.

"Love your neighbor as yourself; but don't take down the fence."
- Carl Sandburg'

Matthew K. Grashoff anticipates receiving his J.D. from Case Western
Reserve University School of Law in May 2013.

1.

Carl Sandburg Quotes, THINK ExIsT.coM, http://thinkexist.com/
quotation/love-your neighbor as-yourself-but donttake/175650.html
(last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Fences are coming down around the world. Since the end of
World War II, a tide of globalization has led to the creation of a
multitude of supranational bodies, such as the United Nations. In the
progressively more interconnected world of the end of the 20th
century and the beginning of the 21st, countries increasingly realize
that international problems halfway around the world can quickly
become domestic problems. In recent years, a new movement toward
"glocalization" 2 resulted in an increase in more regional integration of
legal and economic procedures and organizations around the world.3
In addition, countries have begun recognizing the utility of regional
integration as more than just a means for economic cooperation.4
The North American continent is no different from the rest of the
world in this regard. Most North American efforts at regional
integration to this point were focused on purely economic cooperation,
but the recently proposed United States-Canada "perimeter security"
initiative is one of the first concrete steps taken toward a regional
security partnership., Critics in both countries warn against the
consequences of ceding some measure of national autonomy in order
to enhance collective security.' In order to analyze these concerns, it
may be helpful to examine a similar regional security partnership that
has been in place for some years in the European Union ("EU").
2.

Juan Pablo Pampillo Balifio, The Legal Integration of the American
Continent: An Invitation to Legal Science to Build a New lus
Commune, 17 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 517, 541-42 (2011) ("the double
process known as 'glocalization' (globalization + localization). . . . [Is

the i]ntegration processes (resulting from the simultaneous action of the
centrifugal

forces

localization) . .

3.

..

of globalization

and

the

centripetal

forces

of

").

Id. at 541-42 ("The present economic, political, social and cultural
processes of globalization have been promoting

. . .

a growing regional

rapprochement through continental blocks.").
4.

See Mamedov Muschwig, Crisis of Transatlantic Relations: NATO and
the Future European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), 10 U.
MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 13, 19 (Carmen Klein trans.) (2002).

5.

Canada and the United States Announce Phase I Pilot Project to
Enhance Border Security at Land Ports of Entry, GOv'T OF CAN.,
http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/news/bbg-tpf/canada-and-united-states-

announce-phase-i-pilot-project-enhance-border-security-land
updated Sep. 28, 2012).
6.

(last

See, e.g., Dana Gabriel, U.S.-Canada Perimeter Security and an
Integrated North American Command, DISSIDENT VOICE (June 9, 2011),

http://dissidentvoice.org/2011/06/u-s-canada-perimeter-security-and-anintegrated-north-american-command/.
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Analysis of this analogous arrangement indicates that while the road
to beneficial regional integration is difficult, it is by no means
impassable.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the theories and
motivations behind the modern trend toward regional integration.
Part III provides a summary of the relationship between the United
States and Canada, describing why the two countries currently find
themselves moving closer toward a regional security partnership. Part
IV is a case study of one example of such a regional security
integration: the EU's common foreign and security policy. Part V
analyzes how the lessons learned from the EU's example could be
beneficially applied to the United States-Canada security partnership.
Part VI concludes that while the work required to form a workable
security partnership will be difficult, the benefits make the effort
worthwhile.

II.

THE TREND TOWARD REGIONAL INTEGRATION

In international law a "region" is roughly defined as a small
number of states linked by geography and mutual dependence.' This
linkage leads to common goals and interests, most often economic in
nature, which further leads to cooperation and interconnectedness."
This process is known as "regionalization" or regional integration.9
Regional integration has been a major force in international law
since the Cold War, and especially since the late 1980s.'o Regional
integration agreements are in effect in almost every major region of

7.

ZHENIS KEMBAYEV,

LEGAL ASPECTS

OF THE REGIONAL INTEGRATION

PROCESSES IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA 7 (2009)
Introduction, INTENTIONAL REGIONALISM vii

available

at

(quoting JOSEPH NYE,
(J. Nye ed., 1968)),

http://ebooks.ohiolink.edu/xtfebc/view?docld=tei/sv/

9783540876526 /9783540876526.xml&query=&brand=default.
8.

See Andrew Hurrell, The Regional Dimension in InternationalRelations
Theory, in GLOBAL POLITICS OF REGIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE

38, 46 (Mary Farrell et al., eds., 2005) ("[Regionalism] tended to take as
its starting point the desire to create a common market and to
intentionally privilege transnational economic interests - in order to
avoid the recurrence of war and conflict, to promote economic welfare,
and to protect a particular kind of economic model.").
9.

See OLIVIER DABtNE, THE POLITICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN LATIN

AMERICA 5-11 (2009), for an analysis of various commentators'
definitions of "regional integration," as well as the author's attempt at a

unified definition.
10.

Shaun Breslin & Richard Higgott, Studying Regions: Learning from the
Old, Constructing the New, 5 NEW POL. EcoN. 333, 333 (2000) (noting
the "resurgence in the late 1980s and early 1990s of a number of
significant regional projects . . . .").
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the world, from the Organisation of African Unity to the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations." Russia is attempting to form a
"Eurasian Union"' 2 and the United States has expressed interest in
the creation of a Pacific Rim partnership. 3
Why do states seek to create these regional partnerships? The
benefits are often a matter of scale: global alliances and agreements
can prove unwieldy or unpopular, while smaller regional partnerships
are more manageable and are capable of quickly responding and
adjusting to members' concerns. 4 Additionally, as a practical matter
it is easier to conclude the complicated diplomatic agreements
necessary for regional integration among a small number of regional
partners rather than a geographically disparate group of allies around
the world." The mutual interests of the regional partners also make
negotiations simpler. However, there is no universal reason behind
every regional integration." Each region, and each country, has its
own interests and own reasons for participating (or not) in
integration.
Many theories and examples of regional integration reflect the
fight between two of the foremost theories of political philosophy:

11.

See, e.g., WALTER MATTLI, THE LOGIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION:
EUROPE AND BEYOND 2-9 (1999) (listing a number of regional
partnerships from around the world).

12.

Russia: 3 Countries Join Eurasian Union, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at
A10.

13.

Jackie Calmes, Obama's Trip Emphasizes Role Of Pacific Rim, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at A10; Caren Bohan & Laura MacInnis, Obama

Pivots Towards Asia, Eyeing U.S. Exports and Jobs, YAHOO! (Nov. 19,
2011),
http://news.yahoo.com/analysis-obama-pivots-towards-asiaeyeing-exports-jobs-093306188.html.
14.

See Elzbieta Stadtmilller, Regional Dimensions of Security, in GLOBAL
POLITICS OF REGIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 104, 109 (Mary
Farrell et al. eds., 2005) (noting that the use of regional integrations in
international security reflects the fact that "universal organizations are
as yet unable to create a system that would be really effective in ending
current conflicts, and at the same time, acceptable to the whole global
community").

15.

See KEMBAYEV, supra note 7, at 10 ("[P]olitical, economic, and social
integration is more easily attained among a lesser number of states
within a limited geographic area than on a global basis.").

16.

MILES KAHLER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTEGRATION 7 (1995) (describing a "demand-side theory
of international regimes" that reasons regionalization is a means of
reducing transaction costs between frequent business partners).

17.

See MATTLI, supra note 11, at 3 (1999)
product of many and varied forces.").
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realism and neofunctionalism.' Realism, one of the most influential
theories of international relations, posits that sovereign states are the
supreme actors on the geopolitical stage." Accordingly, they should
not cede power to supranational organizations and should act only in
their own state interest. 20 Intergovernmentalism is a theory of
integration tied to the realist school. 2 1 Intergovernmentalism
highlights the importance of actors, often heads of government, who
undertake joint projects only when circumstances are such that the
projects are in their own national interest.22 The EU's common foreign
and security policy, discussed in Part IV below, is an example of
intergovernmentalism: groups of actors, the European Council and the
Council of Foreign Ministers, enact policies as necessary when the
interests of the Union and Member States are aligned. 23
Intergovernmentalism's main weakness is that it discounts the
importance and ability of non-state actors and outside interests to
influence decisions 24 and the possibility of enhanced efficiency created
by ceding authority to centralized bodies. 25
18.

See BEN ROSAMOND, THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2 (2000)
(describing the "conversation" between realists and neofunctionalists as
the "main ongoing schism in the integration theory literature since the

mid-1960s").
19.

(2000)

See JACK DONNELLY, REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 9

("Realism emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human
nature and the absence of international government.") (emphasis
added).
20.

See id. at 10-11 ("Ethical considerations and objectives,
typically argue, must be subordinated to 'reason of state'
d'etat).").

21.

See
MATTLI,
supra note
11,
"intergovernmental/realist tradition").

22.

See ROSAMOND, supra note 18, at 2 ("In terms of identifying key actors,
intergovernmentalists emphasize the centrality of national executives

23.

GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, DILEMMAS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE
AMBIGUITIES AND PITFALLS OF INTEGRATION BY STEALTH 163 (2005).
Interestingly, Majone proposes a new term for the European Union's
version of intergovernmentalism: "intensive transgovernmentalism."
Majone argues that intergovernmentalism implies a smaller level of
governmental cooperation than is actually present in the Union. Id. at
163-65.

24.

See MATTLI, supra note 11, at 29-30 (noting that intergovernmentalism
focuses only on "episodes of interstate bargaining" rather than "defining
events" that precede or follow those episodes).

25.

See MAJONE, supra note 23, at 162-63 (comparing the "Community
method," involving "delegation of powers by the member states to
supranational institutions," with intergovernmentalism).
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Neofunctionalism addresses this weakness. Neofunctionalism
posits that states will undertake limited integrations in areas of
common concern, and these small projects will produce a "spill-over"
effect that leads to further integration in other areas.26
Neofunctionalism further argues that economic integration is the best
guarantee of global peace and prosperity, and is a necessary precursor
to further political integration. 27 In this manner, neofunctionalism
does not rely on realism or intergovernmentalism's focus on individual
actors driving integration forward: areas of acknowledged common
import, such as trade or security, cry out for cooperation and the
process then gathers momentum from there. 28 Neofunctionalism makes
some key assumptions, however. The theory assumes that
supranational decision-making will be more efficient,29 but as will be
discussed in Part IV-B, supranational decision-making can be more
complicated than decision-making by sole actors.
Regional integrations take a number of different forms, depending
on which theory of international relations its members subscribe to.3 o
By far the most common are integrations based on the
"intergovernmental" form, where the regional partners each designate
representatives to argue for their interests in the meetings of the
partnership." These partnerships operate on the basis of consensus
and sovereign equality, preventing any single partner from dominating
the partnership's policies.32 The other form of regional integration is
26.

See ROSAMOND, supra note 18, at 51-52 (listing seven-step process that,
according to neofunctionalists, would lead to regional integrations);
MAJONE, supra note 23, at 42.

27.

KEMBAYEV, supra note 7, at 12-13 ("[E]conomic integration is the
guarantor of a stable and peaceful international system and may
ultimately lead to political unification.").

28.

See ROSAMOND, supra note 18, at 2 ("In terms of identifying key actors,
. . neofunctionalists point to supranational institutions . . . as well as

national and transnational interest organizations.").
29.

See MATTLI, supra note 11, at 28 ("[N]eofunctionalism leaves several
important questions about integration unanswered, including: why is
decision-making at the supranational level more efficient?"). The
"demand-side theory" referenced in KAHLER, supra note 16, may be one
answer to this question.

30.

See Mary Farrell, The Global Politics of Regionalism: An Introduction,
in GLOBAL POLITICS OF REGIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 2
(Mary Farrell et al., eds., 2005) ("[T]here are many models of
regionalism around the world, with no dominant paradigm to which all
countries and regions subscribe . . .").

31.

See MATTLI, supra note 11, at 28; MAJONE, supra note 23, at 163.

32.

See ROSAMOND, supra note 18, at 14 ("[International organizations] are
traditionally thought of as intergovernmental bodies designed in the
explicit context of converging state preferences or common interests.").
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the "supranational" form, of which the EU is the major example.33 In
supranational integrations, the partners actually cede some measure of
decision-making authority to an autonomous body outside their direct
control that can bind the parties." Intergovernmental forms are often
sufficient for less complex regional integration agreements; however,
as integrations become more complex, supranational forms become
more useful due to the ability to exercise greater autonomy from
member states.3 1 Supranational forms may also suffer from
"democratic deficit," a feeling of detachment or disconnect that
results when supranational bodies lose touch with (or ignore
altogether) the constituents whose interests they supposedly
represent.36 During the EU'songoing financial crisis, this deficit has
been on display, and it is difficult to foresee what the consequences
will be in the future.37
Economic regional integration often leads to security integration
as well. Particularly since September 11, 2001, countries recognize
that the new global infrastructure enables problems around the world
to quickly be transported to their own doorstep. 8 Regional partners
33.

Edward Best, Regional Integration and National Adaptation: Some

Observations

from

European

Experiences,

UNITED

NATIONS

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN,
http://www.eclac.cl/brasil/noticias/paginas/2/22962/
BEST-REGIONAL%20INTEGRATION%20AND%20NATIONAL%20

ADAPTATION.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
34.

KEMBAYEV, supra note 7, at 15.

35.

See Hurrell, supra note 8, at 47 (reasoning that supranational
institutions beneficially affect "cost-benefit calculations," reduce
international
"transaction
costs,"
provide
"information
and
transparency," and facilitate enforcement).

36.

See MIHAIL MILEV, A DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION? 9
(2004),
available
at
http://www.ie-ei.eu/bibliotheque/memoires/
MILEV.pdf (referencing the European Union as an example, where the
European Commission and the Council "are not accountable to the
national parliaments and take their decisions secretively and very often
without referring to the wishes and interests of European citizens").
See, e.g., John R. Bolton, EU's Democratic Deficit, WASH. TIMES (Nov.
26, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/26/eusdemocratic-deficit/
("Even if the EU-wide remedies and the
requirements imposed on countries such as Greece and Italy ultimately
prove to be correct financially, they come with an enormous, corrosive
cost to basic concepts of representative government throughout the EU.
Whether this widening of the democratic deficit ultimately will weaken
the EU itself remains uncertain, but there is no doubt populist
resentment is smoldering in many EU countries.").

37.

38.

See, e.g., L. RONALD SCHEMAN, GREATER AMERICA: A NEW
PARTNERSHIP FOR THE AMERICAS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 47

(2003) ("Today, [Americans] realize that globalization applies to . . .
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band together for enhanced domestic security and to protect shared
interests, such as trade." Contemporary regional security groups are
linked by economics and geography rather than cultural ties; this
prevents groups from becoming "exclusive and culturally monistic,"
which could lead to rivalry and conflict. 40
It is also important to note that not all regional integrations are
completely successful. Enmeshing the policies or practices of a number
of countries can expose some member states to the ill effects of other
member states' decisions or domestic politics. 41 For example, in the
EU there has been controversy over the open-borders program created
by the Schengen Agreement42 as well as the aforementioned crisis over
the financial status of euro zone countries such as Greece and Italy.13
These problems are often products of the scope of the integration
itself and can be remedied or prevented altogether by careful drafting
of integration agreements."
Each theory of integration has strengths and weaknesses. These
strengths and weaknesses are not relevant to this study as pros and
cons, necessarily; countries do not cite a particular theory or
philosophy when they choose to take a particular course of action.
The theories are relevant in that they provide a theoretical
weapons that can cross national frontiers almost as readily as can
capital

or

technology.

.

. . Rapidly

evolving

transportation

and

communication patterns are producing new security priorities.").
39.

See, e.g., ROSAMOND, supra note 18, at 132 ("Rational states realize
[that their survival is always in question], and so seek to maximize the
possibilities for their survival. . .. The emergence of alliances and forms
of cooperation is a well-established rational means to the end of survival

40.

See Stadtmilller, supra note 14, at 109.

41.

See Harriet Alexander, Denmark's Defiance over Frontier Controls has
Left European Union Bordering on Crisis, THE TELEGRAPH (May 15,
2011, 8:00 AM BST), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
europe/denmark/8514180/Denmarks-defiance-over-frontier-controls-hasleft-European-Union-bordering-on-crisis.html.

42.

See id.(describing Denmark's fight to reinstate domestic border security
due to crime, illegal immigration, and drug trafficking resulting from the
lack of border checks).

43.

See 'Historic Opportunity': Greece Pulls Off Debt Restructuring Deal,
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.spiegel.de/international
/europe/0,1518,820343,00.html (summarizing Greek efforts to resolve
the domestic debt crisis before it significantly impacts the euro zone).

44.

See, e.g., Ben Rooney, European Leaders to Take on Crisis at Summit,
CNN MONEY (Dec. 5, 2011, 11:13 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/
12/04/news/international/european crisis summit/index.htm?hpt=hp
t1 (describing European efforts to resolve the euro zone crisis, which
could include redrafting European Union treaties).
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background of the area, and point to potential issues that could arise
in the future. The United States-Canada paradigm offers its own
unique set of policy problems and considerations for a regional
security partnership, and application of any variety of theories or
forms of regional integration may be appropriate. Discerning those
unique problems requires a closer look at the history of the
relationship between the two North American powers.

III. THE U.S.-CANADIAN

RELATIONSHIP

A. Pre-9/11

If "geography is destiny," as the common saying goes, then the
United States and Canada are meant for each other. The United
States and Canada maintain a special, mutually beneficial
relationship,"5 and continue prosperous bi-lateral trade. 46 The two
countries maintain the longest land border between two countries in
the world. 47 Historically, the border gradually extended as the two
countries expanded westward, and was clarified by a number of
treaties and agreements.48
45.

See, e.g., H.L. Keenleyside, The Canada-UnitedStates Permanent Joint
Board on Defence, 1940-1945, 16 INT'L J. 50, 52 (1960) (quoting
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt assuring Canadians that the
United States would stand by Canada in the event of Nazi invasion),
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40198517.pdf?accept
TC=true; Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Address at the Fifth Annual Border Security Conference
(Aug. 11, 2008), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/
securing-the-u.s.-border (quoting a statement by President John F.
Kennedy to the Canadian Parliament: "Geography has made us
neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has made us
partners, and necessity has made us allies. Those whom God has so
joined together, let no man put asunder.").

46.

The two countries are each other's largest foreign investor, and
currently $1.6 billion of trade occurs between them per day. CanadaU.S. Perimeter Security Deal Will Benefit Both Countries, VANCOUVER
SUN,
June 8, 2011,
http://www.canada.com/story print.html?id
=6518c41d-ccl6-45df-8fec-4c975caf5046&sponsor.

47.

See, e.g., Russell C. Gray, Note, Run From the Border: The United
States Re-Evaluation of its Northern Boundary, 27 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 77, 77 (2003) ("Five thousand, five hundred, and
twenty five miles divide the two nations, occupying nearly an entire
continent.").

48.

For a discussion of the laborious process by which the United StatesCanada border has been defined, see generally Frank Jacobs, The NotSo-Straight Story of the U.S.-Canadian Border, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28,
2011),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/a-not-sostraight-story/.
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As part of the special US-Canadian relationship, the two countries
frequently cooperate in matters of mutual concern. These matters
have often been economic in nature, owing to the prominence of each
country in the other's foreign trade.49 Since Canada gained control of
its foreign relations and military policy the United Kingdom in the
years between World War I and World War II," the two countries
have coordinated defense policies in a few instances. Prior to the
United States' entry into World War II, many Canadians were
concerned that Germany would overrun Great Britain and that
Canada would be left without protection." In August 1940, American
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister
William Lyon Mackenzie King met in Ogdensburg, New York to
discuss what became known as the Ogdensburg Agreement.52 The
main result of the Agreement was the creation of the Permanent Joint
Board on Defence, a group charged with managing the common
defense of the two countries. 3
Even then, many Canadians were concerned with the implications
of ceding sovereignty. Critics asserted that the King government
effectively ceded Canadian sovereignty to the Americans by giving too
much operational control of Canadian forces to their American

49.

See Gray, supra note 47, at 77 ("It is estimated by U.S. and Canadian
officials that [the countries engage in] trade of more than one billion

dollars per day and $475 billion annually.").
50.

This gradual process culminated with the Statute of Westminster in
1931, which gave British dominions (including Canada) power to control
their own foreign affairs. See generally Gregory A. Johnson & David A.
Lenarcic, The Decade of Transition: The North Atlantic Triangle
During the 1920s, in THE NORTH ATLANTIC TRIANGLE IN A CHANGING
WORLD: ANGLO-AMERICAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS, 1902-1956, at 81, 92-

97 (B.J.C. McKercher & Lawrence Aronsen eds., 1996) (section titled

"North American Withdrawal" detailing
autonomy);

Paul

Halsall,

Canadian efforts toward

Modern History Sourcebook: Statute of

Westminster, 1931, FORDHAM UNIV. (1998), http://www.fordham.edu/

halsall/mod/1936westminster.htmI (text of the Statute of Westminster).
51.

See Canada and the World: A History, FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE
CAN.

(Sept.

9,

2011),

http://www.international.gc.ca/history-

histoire/world-monde/1939-1945.aspx?lang=eng&view
52.

=d.

John Alan English, Not an Equilateral Triangle: Canada's Strategic
Relationship with the United States and Britain, 1939-1945, in THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TRIANGLE IN A CHANGING WORLD: ANGLo-AMERICAN-

CANADIAN RELATIONS, 1902-1956, at 147, 163 (B.J.C. McKercher &
Lawrence Aronsen eds., 1996).

53.

See Symposium, North American Dispute Settlement: Settlement of
InternationalDisputes between Canada and the USA, 35 CAN.-U.S. L.J.
9, 53 (2011).
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counterparts." The Agreement was soon redrafted to address these
concerns. In the revised agreement, Canadian authorities reasserted
control over their forces from American defense commands.u
After World War II ended, the Permanent Joint Board on
Defence continued its operations." The United States and Canada
further enhanced mutual security by becoming members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Founded in 1949, NATO was
meant to act as a counterweight to the influence of the Soviet bloc.,"
The United States and Canada remained strategic partners
throughout the Cold War, further enmeshing armed forces through an
agreement to operate the North American Air Defense Command
(later the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and now
commonly referred to as NORAD) in 1 9 5 7 .- NORAD is structured as
a bi-national command, involving both American and Canadian
officers in command positions. 9
B. Post-9/11 - The Current System
The events of September 11, 2001 had a large impact on the
United States-Canada border. Before 9/11 the northern border had
relatively low security; however, after 9/11 the United States enacted
various reforms aimed at "thickening" the border." The United States

54.

See J.L. Granatstein, The Conservative Party and the Ogdensburg
Agreement, 22 INT'L J. 73, 76 (1966) ("To the Conservative Party, then,
Ogdensburg was just another Liberal attempt to abandon the [British]
Empire in preference to the United States.

. .

. [N]o situation, however

serious, could justify an American alliance.").
55.

See English, supra note 52, at 165-66 (discussing Canadian refusal to

cede authority over Canadian forces and the resulting coordination of
U.S.-Canada military efforts by "mutual cooperation").
56.

See The Permanent Joint Board on Defence, NAT'L DEF. & THE
CANADIAN FORCES (Oct. 11, 2001), http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-

nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=298.
57.

See, e.g., Formation of NATO and Warsaw Pact, HISTORY.COM,
http://www.history.com/
topics/formation-of-nato-and-warsaw-pact
(last visited Nov. 11, 2012).

58.

http://www.norad.mil/about/
NORAD
Chronology,
NORAD,
NORAD%2OHistory_ ENCLISH.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).

59.

See Jerome Corsi, NORAD's New Home, WORLDNETDAILY (June 19,
2007), http://www.wnd. com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=56234.

60.

See, e.g., Phred Dvorak, Canada, U.S., Press for Cooperation on
Border Issues, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/

article/SB100014240527487047093045761245427 75441406.html. For the
contrary opinion that border "thickening" is over-emphasized, see Luiza
Ch. Savage, WikiLeaks Cable: Border not 'Thickening', BILATERALIST
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.bilateralist.com/2011/04/28/wikileaks-
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and Canada collectively enacted the "Smart Border Initiative," a 30point plan for strengthening security at the border.' Of note, five of
the points involve ensuring "secure flow of goods" while maintaining
effective security.6 2 There are currently a number of United StatesCanada trade and security agreements aimed at addressing the issue
of border security, including Partners in Protection (PIP), CustomsAdvance
Terrorism
(C-TPAT),
Trade Partnership Against
Commercial Information (ACI), Free and Secure Trade (FAST), and
Customs Self Assessment (CSA).63
An unintended consequence of these actions was that Canadian
companies that previously relied on fast and efficient border crossings
began losing money." In addition, partisan political conflicts in the
United States led to the introduction of "Buy American" provisions in
legislation, further damaging Canadian interests." American political
bickering has also resulted in the indefinite postponement of the
Keystone XL project, a $7 billion pipeline that would connect
Canadian oil sands to U.S. refineries on the Gulf of Mexico.66 The
Canadian government has lobbied hard in favor of Keystone XL,
subtly hinting to American authorities that if the pipeline is not built
to the Gulf of Mexico, it will be built to Canada's west coast where
the oil can be shipped to China.67

cable-border-thickening/
(discussing leaked U.S. diplomatic
indicating that "the border in most places runs smoothly").

cable

61.

The Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration, FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L
TRADE CAN. (Feb. 7, 2003), http://www.international.gc.ca/antiterrorism/actionplan-en.asp.

62.

Id. (points 14-18).

63.

See Dunniela Kaufman, Does Security Trump Trade?, 13 LAw & Bus.
REv. AM. 619, 626 (2007).

64.

See, e.g., Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness: Action
(Dec.
7,
2011),
Gov'T
OF
CAN.
Plan
in
Brief,
http://www.borderactionplan-plandactionfrontalier.gc.ca/psec-scep/
assets/pdfs/bap brief-paf bref-eng-dec2011.pdf [hereinafter Canadian
December 7 Action Plan] ("Even the most conservative estimates put
direct border costs to the Canadian economy at an amount equivalent
to one percent of our gross domestic product, or $16 billion a year.").
See Les Whittington, Easing Border Irritants Can Steady Faltering
18,
2011),
STAR
(Nov.
Bilateral
Ties,
TORONTO
www.thestar.com/news/article/1089561.

65.

66.

See Jennifer Steinhauer, Measures to Speed Pipeline Fail, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 8, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/03/08/measures-to-speed-pipeline-fail/?scp=3&sq=keystone
%20pipeline&st=cse.

67.

For a brief history of the Keystone XL controversy, see Times Topics,
Keystone XL, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
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Some Canadian sources advocated pursuing common security
policies even before 9/11,68 but after 9/11 Canadians realized that
trade with the United States would be jeopardized by enhanced
American security at the northern border. A common security plan
could allay American fears and result in easing security along the
border itself, leading to an easing of trade flow.69 For the United
States' part, even with the enhanced security and "thickening" of the
northern border, a December 2010 report indicated that only 32 miles
of the 4,000-mile border were guarded by an "acceptable level of
security."' 0 This is because the northern border can be crossed on foot
almost anywhere, making "effective control" difficult; however, the
outer perimeter is only accessible via seaports and airports, where
"effective control" is much easier to achieve."
To address these concerns, the United States and Canada
proposed a "perimeter security" plan to enhance cooperation and
create further cohesion between domestic security policies. 72 Some
critics (mainly, but not exclusively, Canadian) express concern about

68.
69.

timestopics/subjects/k/keystone-pipeline/index.html?scp=1spot&sq=keystone%20pipeline&st=cse (last updated Mar. 22, 2012).
See John Noble, Fortress America or Fortress North America?, 11 LAW
& Bus. REV. AM. 461, 462-66 (2005).
See Blayne Haggart, Fortress North America? What "Perimeter
Security" Means for Canada: Seminar Report, PARLIAMENTARY
RESEARCH BRANCH (Dec. 18, 2001), available at http://dsp-

psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/PRB-e/PRB0125-e.pdf
("[W]ithout a common security plan, Canada's trade access to the
United States-and thus its economic well-being-is endangered.").
70.

U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-97, BORDER SECURITY:
ENHANCED DHS OVERSIGHT AND ASSESSMENT OF INTERAGENCY
COORDINATION IS NEEDED FOR THE NORTHERN BORDER 36 n.62 (2010)

(measuring level of security by examining whether Border Patrol has

"effective control" over the section of border or whether Border Patrol
can bring an illegal entry "to a satisfactory law enforcement
resolution.").
71.

See, e.g., Securing the Northern Border: Views from the Front Lines
Before the Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, S.
Hrg. 110-1024, at 12-13 (2008) (statement of Brenna Neinast, Chief,

Border Patrol Sector Havre, U.S. Customs and Border Protection)

(describing various challenges with implementing the "defense in depth"
plan called for the Border Patrol National Strategy, including the

country's "diverse border terrain" and the need for a "balance of
personnel technology and tactical infrastructure that is tailored to each
specific environment").
72.

See Beyond the Border: a Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and
Economic Competitiveness, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, http://www.
borderactionplan-plandactionfrontalier.gc.ca/psec-scep/index.aspx?lang
=eng (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
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the perimeter security plan. They worry that Canada will cede too
much of its sovereignty in a joint security plan with the United States
and that the United States will impose enhanced Patriot Act-like
security measures that will erode Canadian civil liberties." These
critics tend to follow the common tendency of Canadians to assert
their cultural identity in the negative: as not American." However, a
Canadian willingness to adopt a "North American" as opposed to a
not-American or "European" philosophy could lead to benefits for
Canada."
The chief American concern is losing any control over homeland
security policies during the war on terror." These concerns reflect the
idea that control over national security and foreign policy is
traditionally regarded as a paramount aspect of a country's
sovereignty. Given the substantial economic and security benefits
that regional partnerships can create, however, it is possible that the

73.

See Gabriel, supra note 4; Steven Chase, Canada Negotiating Perimeter
Security Deal with U.S.,
GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 8, 2010),
canada-negotiatinghttp://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
perimeter-security-deal-with-us/articlel830782; Mark Kennedy, CanadaU.S. Perimeter Security Deal Crucial: Diplomats, CALGARY HERALD

3,
2011),
http://www2.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/
(June
story.html?id=009235ea-c749-43c6-8d82-Of2dfd35d884.
74.

See PHILIP RESNICK, THE EUROPEAN ROOTS OF CANADIAN IDENTITY 76

(2005). For a discussion of the historical tension between nationalism
and internationalism in Canadian culture, see JONATHAN F. VANCE, A
HISTORY OF CANADIAN CULTURE 247-50 (2009).

75.

RESNICK, supra note 74, at 76 ("Being North American can open the
door to a more capacious sense of self, to a future-oriented mentality, to
a greater willingness to champion technological and scientific
experimentation and individual endeavour.").

76.

See Edward Alden, U.S.-Canada Security Perimeter in 2011, SECURJTY
DEBRIEF (Dec. 13, 2010), http://securitydebrief.com/2010/12/13/uscanada-perimeter-security-in-2011 ("While the initiative as outlined
makes tremendous sense on both sides of the border, it will face
significant opposition . . . in the United States from those who favor

unilateral approaches to securing the borders.").
77.

See, e.g., Elizabeth Shaver Duquette, The European Union's Common
Foreign and Security Policy: Emerging from the U.S. Shadow?, 7 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 169, 170 (2001)

("[T]here can be little doubt that foreign policy, and in particular defense
policy, pinpoints even more centrally the core of a nation's concept of
control."); RODRIGO TAVARES, REGIONAL SECURITY: THE CAPACITY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 131 (2009) ("[Djefense was considered a

fundamental part of national sovereignty and few countries were
prepared to give it up.").
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time has come for the United States to reevaluate the approach of
preserving sole control of its security policy.78
While the United States and Canada have identified areas of
common need and interest, a key step on the way to integration and
cooperation," the critics' concerns must be answered before any
serious perimeter security plan can move forward. One productive
way of answering the critics' concerns is to show a successful example
of similar security integration and cooperation, and then show how
the U.S.-Canadian partnership might emulate that pattern. The
experience of the EU since its formation in 1999 is such an example.
IV. THE EU

PARADIGM

The long process of European integration began in the years
following World War II. The ultimate goal of European policymakers
was to prevent future conflicts by economically enmeshing the
countries of Europe." The nascent EU system developed via Member
States willingly ceding aspects of sovereignty to central supranational
organizations." In the 1950s, these cessions were most often economic
in nature; however, as predicted by the neofunctionalist theory
described in Part II, these economic cessions eventually spilled over
into calls for unified European foreign and security policy.82
Ceding domestic control over areas of foreign policy and security
is especially significant, since these areas are traditionally among the
most sacrosanct areas of a country's sovereignty." While some states

78.

See Stadtmiiller, supra note 14, at 118 ("[I]solation from [regional

partnerships] is unrealistic for any state. In the long term, regional
cooperation can be helpful in providing economic stabilisation and
multidimensional security.").
79.

See Balifho, supra note 3, at 541 ("If we can take advantage of European
lessons, it will be necessary, within our own region, to identify goods
and resources that may promote a pooling of interests similar to the one
that coal and steel generated in Europe.").

80.

See, e.g., TAVARES, supra note 77, at 131 (referencing the Schuman
Declaration of 1950, aimed at creating a "de facto solidarity that would
ultimately . make war between France and Germany materially
impossible") (internal quotations omitted).

81.

See Baliiio, supra note 2, at 525-26.

82.

See TAVARES, supra note 77, at 131 ("The foreign policy of Europe was
born of what was felt to be a need on the part of the member states of
the European Economic Community to consult each other more
effectively on foreign policy issues.").

83.

See, e.g., Duquette, supra note 77, at 170 ("[Tlhere can be little doubt
that foreign policy, and in particular defense policy, pinpoints even more
centrally the core of a nation's concept of control."); TAVARES, supra
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have expressed concern over the integration of European foreign
policy,m the process nevertheless continues today. The EUhas even
gone so far as to create the Schengen area, a large territory without
internal border checks-perhaps the ultimate embrace of perimeter
security."'
A. The Evolution of the European Union's Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP)

The EU's roots trace back to the tumultuous years after World
War II, when Western Europe sought to prevent a recurrence of
World War II and to revitalize itself in order to face the Soviet bloc
to the east. 6 Following the common model of most regional
integrations," the EU began due to a desire for economic
collaboration." In 1950, France proposed the creation of an
organization dedicated to enhancing European cooperation in coal and
steel production." This group, the European Coal and Steel
note 77, at 131 ("[D]efense was considered a fundamental part of
national sovereignty and few countries were prepared to give it up.").
84.

See, e.g., Ben Tonra & Thomas Christiansen, The Study of EU Foreign
Policy: Between International Relations and European Studies, in
RETHINKING EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN POLICY 1 (Ben Tonra & Thomas
Christiansen eds., 2004) ("[T]he reluctance of member states to submit
their diplomacy to the strait-jacket of EU decision-making has
remained.").

85.

See Amos Guiora, International Cooperation in Homeland Security,
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES No. 057-08-09, at 20 (July

2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=1160067 (noting Schengen
area practices including "standardiz[ed] external border checks and . . .
information coordination" and the elimination of internal border
checks).
86.

See

STEVE MARSH & HANS MACKENSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (2005) ("The US had little to

fear in 1947 from the USSR's military threat, but West European
nations were much less secure.").
87.

See KEMBAYEV, supra note 7, at 11 ("As Haas has argued, economic
integration 'may be based on political motives and frequently begets
political consequences."') (citing ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF
EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FORCES 1950-1957, at 12

(1958)).
88.

Of course, this economic collaboration would also effectively prevent
European states from going to war against each other. See, e.g.,
TAVARES, supra note 77, at 131 (referencing the Schuman Declaration of
1950, aimed at creating a "de facto solidarity that would ultimately
make war between France and Germany materially impossible")
(internal quotations omitted).

89.

See, e.g., MARSH & MACKENSTEIN, supra note 86, at 7 (noting that
besides the economic benefits of the Community, coal and steel were
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Community, survived to become one of the founding Communities of
the EU."0
The Coal and Steel Community, like other Communities of the
fledgling European integration, was not focused on security or foreign
policy cooperation. Gradually, European countries began to recognize
the beneficial possibilities of pursuing common foreign and security
policy (CFSP)." The idea for CFSP and further European political
integration was first proposed at The Hague in 1969 and was further
discussed and reinforced in subsequent meetings.92 The Single
European Act (SEA), which came into effect in 1987, contained the
first treaty codification of CFSP."
In 1992, the EU was formally created by the signing of the Treaty
of European Union (TEU).94 Title V of the TEU further expanded the
CFSP, designating it as one of the three "pillars" of the EU.6 In less
than a decade, the CFSP developed from an idea in the SEA to a
central part of the nascent EU.16 Despite its prominent role in the
governing scheme codified by the TEU, however, the CFSP was
ineffective at best; one writer described it as a "paper tiger with
teething problems.""

"key materials for war" and sharing those resources would aid in
Franco-German reconciliation as well as western European rearmament
to face the Soviets).
90.

Balifio, supra note 3, at 522.

91.

See TAVARES, supra note 77, at 131 ("The foreign policy of Europe was
born of what was felt to be a need on the part of the member states of
the European Economic Community to consult each other more
effectively on foreign policy issues.").

92.

GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN

UNION LAw 1122 (3d ed. 2011) (listing meetings in Copenhagen in 1973,
London in 1981, and Stuttgart in 1983).
93.

ALBRECT ROTHACHER, UNITING EUROPE: JOURNEY BETWEEN GLOOM AND

GLORY 186 (2005); Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
94.

Federiga Bindi, European Union Foreign Policy: A Historical Overuiew,
in THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ASSESSING EUROPE'S

ROLE IN THE WORLD 26 (Federiga Bindi ed., 2010); Treaty on European
Union, 29 July 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191).
95.

See Duquette, supra note 77, at 173.

96.

See Daniel T. Murphy, The European Union's Common Foreign and
Security Policy: It is Not Far From Maastricht to Amsterdam, 31
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 871, 875 (1998) (describing the CFSP as an
"acknowledged and valued-though purely extra-Community" idea in the

SEA).
97.

ROTHACHER, supra note 93, at 187.
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The members of the EU signed the Amsterdam Treaty (AT) in
1997 and it came into effect on May 1, 1999." Rather than enhancing
the effectiveness of the CFSP, the AT scaled back the ambitious
CFSP language in the TEU."9 One of the major CFSP reforms
introduced in the AT was the creation of the office of High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.'
The High Representative was charged with overall coordination of the
CFSP."' However, the AT did not give the High Representative much
real power to carry out this mission: the High Representative could
only make "proposals" to the Council for CFSP actions.'02 Much of
the Representative's effectiveness depended on the staff work of the
Representative's officers and the Representative's own personal
persuasive abilities.'
Interestingly, the AT does add an objective to the CFSP:
guarding the territorial integrity of the EU in accordance with United
Nations principles. 04 The reference to the integrity of the Union as a
whole, rather than Member States in particular, is a curious semantic
indicator of perimeter security-like thinking. This language indicates a
desire to instill a "territorial security identity" for the Union.'
EU members recognized that reforms were still needed, however.
The Treaty of Lisbon, signed in late 2007 and entered into force on
December 1, 2009, was primarily a reform treaty."o The main purpose
98.

Bindi, supra note 94, at 34.

99.

See Murphy, supra note 96, at 899 ("If anything, the AT takes a step
backwards in stating the overall aim of the CFSP").

100. See High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy,

OFFICE

OF

THE

HIGH

REPRESENTATIVE,

http://www.

highrepresentative.eu (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
101. See Chiara Cellerino, The New European External Action Service and
the Lisbon Call for Coherence of European External Action: Issues of
Accountability and Scope, 2010 COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 22, 22 (2010).
102. See Nicola Verola, The New EU Foreign Policy under the Treaty of
Lisbon, in THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ASSESSING
EUROPE'S ROLE IN THE WORLD 41, 44 (Federiga Bindi ed., 2010) (noting

the continued "ambiguities"
powers).

of the High Representative's role and

103. See id. at 45 ("The High Representative's success will depend on the
ability to . . . relate with the other commissioners and the member

states."); ROTHACHER, supra note 93, at 187.
104. Duquette, supra note 77, at 180.
105. See Jorg Monar, The European Union's Foreign Affairs System After
the Treaty of Amsterdam: A 'Strengthened Capacity for External
Action'?, 2 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 413, 415 (1997).

106. See Jacob Schall Holberg, The Treaty of Lisbon-Towards an Ever
Closer Union, with a Formal Withdrawal Procedure, 17 COLUM. J. EUR.
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of the TOL was to adapt the earlier EU treaties to the increased size
and complexity of the Union.' 7 One of the key areas of evolution and
adaptation was in the area of CFSP decision-making, to be discussed
below.
The TOL added responsibilities to the High Representative
position, in effect creating a "double-hatted" High Representative to
act as a CFSP executive.o8 The TOL also created the European
External Action Service (EEAS), a sort of "European diplomatic
corps" charged with assisting the High Representative in enacting the
CFSP.'"9 Some Member States expressed concern that the EEAS
would be too independent and unaccountable to other parts of the
Union, but further negotiations placed restrictions on the EEAS."o
B. Decision-Making Processes and Voting Procedures Within the CFSP.

The evolution of the CFSP has consistently focused on the
process to be used in decision-making and setting policies. Decisionmaking processes are critical to any attempt at regional integration:
without an efficient method of making decisions, policies and actions
will become haphazard and disjointed."' Regional integrations must
balance the national interests of member states with the recognition
that "common interests can often better be realized by joint efforts"
than by unilateral efforts," 2 and adapt their decision-making processes

L. ONLINE 11, 11-12 (2010) ("The TOL is generally understood as a

reform treaty of the European Union, as opposed to a foundational
treaty . . .") (emphasis original).

107. Id. ("[The TOL's] main aim was to adapt the European Union's
constitutional framework in order to make it both suitable and
manageable for some twenty-seven Member States.").
108. See Giorgio Maganza, Essay, The Lisbon Treaty: A Brief Outline, 31
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1603, 1612 (2008).

109. See Cellerino, supra note 101, at 22-23.
110. Id. at 24-25 (noting various reporting duties, budgetary controls, and
staffing requirements imposed on the EEAS that strike a "good balance
... between operative independence and Community accountability").
111. See Stadtmiiller, supra note 14, at 113 (listing "an ability to act
coherently" as a necessary precondition to regional security
partnerships); Muschwig, supra note 4, at 20 ("The fragmentation of
decision-making processes with regard to foreign policy, both within
Member States and among international institutions is virtually a

prescription for a lack of coherence.").
112. See RoY H. GINSBERG, DEMYSTIFYING THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE
ENDURING LOGIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 288 (2010) ("Member
states recognize that they can be more effective at less cost if they

respond together to influence international issues too large for any one
of them to handle well alone (concept of politics of scale).").
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so that a few stubborn members cannot hold up action by the rest of
the partnership.
In the EU's CFSP, this tension over decision-making processes
has most often manifested in the context of voting procedures. When
not part of a regional integration, sovereign states are not obligated to
accept foreign control over domestic systems and policies."' In
recognition of the fact that EU Member States cede control of a
crucial aspect of their internal policies by agreeing to join the Union,
CFSP decisions were initially required to be reached unanimously."'
An ongoing controversy in CFSP discussions is whether unanimity
should be preserved out of respect for the importance of the decisions
being made on behalf of Member States under CFSP, at the expense
of decision-making efficiency." 5
One apparently beneficial aspect of the Amsterdam Treaty is that
it emphasized decision-making rather than strict unanimity."' Under
the AT, the possibility of qualified majority voting on CFSP decisions
such as joint actions, common positions, and common strategies was
introduced, theoretically making it easier to undertake concerted
action."' However, any Member State that intended to oppose a
measure was allowed to object and thereby prevent a vote being
taken. Thus, in effect unanimity was still required."' Additionally, in
the AT Members are allowed to make "qualified" abstentions. A
qualified abstention means that the Member is not obligated to apply
the decision domestically, but has to acknowledge the decision or

113. See Holberg, supra note 106, at 13 (referring to the "principle that
sovereign states are not obliged to accept foreign involvement in their
internal systems" in international law).
114. Id. (noting that "[a] system based on unanimity is common in
international law" and that "[a] principle of unanimity ensures that each
and every Member State has the right to veto").
115. See, e.g., KAREN E. SMITH, EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN POLICY IN A
CHANGING WORLD 25 (2003) ("[T]he member states have sought to

retain control over decision-making procedures, and have jealously
guarded their own autonomy, especially in the spheres of foreign and
security policy . .

).

116. See Monar, supra note 105, at 415-16 (noting the AT's changes to the
CFSP framework and pointing out "[t]he emphasis here is clearly on
decisions and actions to be taken rather than simply engaging in a
process").
117. See Bindi, supra note 94, at 35 (noting that the effect of this provision
is limited because it only applies to CFSP decisions made by the
European Council).
118. Murphy, supra note 96, at 901.
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policy as binding on the Union as a whole."' However, if a sufficient
number of Member States, constituting a sufficient amount of the
EU's population, abstain in this manner, the decision will be
rejected.120 The disjointed nature of these decision-making processes
potentially removes legitimacy from CFSP decisions and leaves
individual Members with more power. 12 ' This compromise, seemingly
giving "abstentionists" more power to block CFSP decisions in return
for the possibility of majority or qualified-majority voting on some
issues, is indicative of the Union's muddled priorities when it comes to
CFSP decision-making.122
It is interesting to note that the EU's concern with unanimous
voting overlooks the example of NATO, which seeks "consensus" in
every aspect of its decision-making processes.123 NATO members
communicate effectively among themselves to harmonize national
policies to the extent possible, preventing any diminished effectiveness
due to decision-making difficulties.'24 There are a number of possible
reasons for NATO's increased efficiency vis-A-vis the CFSP. First,
NATO consensus is achieved not by affirmative voting, but by asking
if a member explicitly objects to a proposal."' This allows a country
to effectively abstain, refusing to voice its dissension on the record if
it knows that the majority of other members wish to take an action.
A member state can thereby remove itself from the process without

119. See Duquette, supra note 77, at 185 ("If the Member State's abstention
is 'qualified,' then the Member State is not obliged to apply the

decision, but must accept that it binds the Union.").
120. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 92, at 1124 ("If the Member States

qualifying their abstentions in this way represent more than one-third of
the Member States comprising more than one-third of the EU
population, the decision would not be adopted.").
121. See ROTHACHER, supra note 93, at 189 ("[T]his fragmented structure for

decision-making has all the trappings of multiple hybrid compromises
with individual member states remaining the key actors.").
122. See Monar, supra note 105, at 421 (noting that some Member States are
"so desperately attached to majority voting as an ideology" that they
are willing to "pay any price for any sort of progress" to that goal).
123. See PAUL GALLIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21510, NATO's DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURE 2 (2003), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au

/awc/awcgate/crs/rs21510.pdf ("Consensus is clearly differentiated from
unanimity,' which NATO does not seek. Unanimity would require an
actively stated vote in favor of a measure.").
124. See Duquette, supra note 77, at 188-89 ("[NATO members] exchange

information and opinions and disclose plans for national operations ...
all with the goal of ensuring that national policies complement, or at
least do not hinder, NATO policy.").
125. TAVARES, supra note 77, at 147.
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having to hold up or derail the decision, as can happen in CFSP
decision-making procedures.'12 Second, countries may use the "silence
procedure," where they deliver a private letter to the NATO
Secretary-General stating objection to a proposed course of action.'12
The "silence procedure" allows countries to make their objections
known without confrontation, and potentially without being leaked to
the press, further streamlining decision-making.128 Third, NATO's
narrower role as a defense organization may naturally lead to fewer
disputes when compared to the CFSP's larger role in EU affairs.129
In addition to the occasionally convoluted voting procedures, the
CFSP involves numerous EU committees and councils in CFSP
decision-making.'
The Council of Ministers and the European
Council have the leading roles, but the Commission is also heavily
involved and the European Parliament is given an advisory role."'
This plethora of agencies creates the possibility of a "too many cooks
in the kitchen" scenario, whereby CFSP decisions are negatively
affected due to the overabundance of voices providing input.132
C. Availability of Different Forms of CFSP Actions

In order to alleviate these potential problems, CFSP decisionmakers are able to utilize a number of different forms of action
available to them. Which action is taken depends on political will and

126. See GALLIS, supra note 123, at 3 (describing the NATO decision to
intervene in Kosovo, where the Greek government was not in favor of
the action but maintained silence so as not to impede the decisionmaking process).
127. See TAVARES, supra note 77, at 147.
128. See GALLIS, supra note 123, at 3 (noting the confrontation-avoidance
and media-control benefits associated with the silence procedure, as well
as that the procedure allows countries to not send a letter if they do not
wish to appear out of touch with allies' actions).
129. See id. at 5 ("The EU is different in nature from NATO. The EU must
grapple with issues involving the sharing of national sovereignty on a
wide range of issues.").
130. See Monar, supra note 105, at 421-22 (describing the role of the
European Council and the Council of Ministers in CFSP decisionmaking after the AT).
131. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 883-84.
132. For an examination of one incident where fragmented CFSP decisionmaking resulted in embarrassment for Union members, see Jorg Monar,
Editorial Comment: The CFSP and the Leila/Perejil Island Incident:
The Nemesis of Solidarity and Leadership, 7 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV.
251 (2002).
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the needs of the situation. There are three types of CFSP action:
common positions, joint actions, and common strategies.133
Common positions are broad directives governing Members'
conduct on an issue of a "geographical or thematic nature."1 34 For
instance, economic sanctions are frequent subjects of common
positions.'35 Member States must implement common positions in
domestic policies, and Member States must adhere to the common
position in international forums.'36 However, the exact manner of
implementation is left up to each Member State. Under the TEU a
common position is supposed to be taken only after unanimous vote;
however qualified majority voting is allowed in some circumstances. 3 7
The difference between common positions and joint actions is
mainly that joint actions imply the Union is actually taking action in
a matter. 3 s For instance, past joint actions included election
monitoring in Russia and South Africa, providing humanitarian aid to
Bosnia, and promoting the extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.' 9 Member States are required to observe and implement the
directives of a joint action in their own policies. 4 0 Under the TEU,
CFSP decision-makers could only consider a joint action on a matter

133. See, e.g., MARSH & MACKENSTEIN, supra note 86, at 64-65 (2005).
134. See SMITH, supra note 115, at 44.
135. See, e.g., CLARA PORTELLA, EUROPEAN UNION SANCTIONS AND FOREIGN
POLICY: WHEN AND WHY DO THEY WORK? (2010) (mentioning frequent

use of common positions to enforce sanctions); Bindi, supra note 94, at
28 (noting that between November 1993 and May 1995, fourteen
common positions were adopted, "mainly concerning economic sanctions
against third parties").
136. See GINSBERG, supra note 112, at 256 ("In a common position, the
member states are obliged to comply with an EU position in the
implementation of their national foreign policies.").
137. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 879-80 ("In a Declaration incorporated
into the Final Act of the adoption of the TEU, the Member States
agreed that, within CFSP, whenever the Council is to act by unanimity,
they would to the extent possible avoid preventing a unanimous vote if
a qualified majority favors the decision.") (internal quotation omitted).
138. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 115, at 38 (noting that the "action" taken
can be as simple as spending money).
139. See Bindi, supra note 94, at 28 (describing various joint actions the
Union has undertaken).
140. Duquette, supra note 77, at 183 ("Once the Council adopts a joint
action, the Member States must align their foreign policy as
necessary.").
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if the European Council referred the matter to them. 14' This limited
the efficacy and efficiency of CFSP decision-making, but served as a
political check on undesirable CFSP decisions.142
The AT added a form of action called common strategies.143
Common strategies are designed to be less "tactical" than common
positions or joint actions, and must clearly state goals and
objectives.' 44 It is unclear, however, whether common strategies
specifically bind Member States to implementing the policy or
position of the common strategy.'4 5 The ambiguity of common
strategies can also lead to ineffective implementation in the real
world,'4 6 and the use of common strategies is rare.'47 Consequently it
still appears that for any CFSP policy to have real effect, one of the
larger Members such as France, Germany, or Great Britain must
advocate for or enforce it. 4 8
D. Deference to Outside Bodies

One of the more effective ways the CFSP has been structured is
in its deference to outside bodies. The voting procedures discussed
above provide some measure of protection to Member States insofar
141. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 881 ("The Council of Ministers is to
decide whether a matter should be the subject of a joint action on the
basis of guidelines furnished by the European Council.").
142. See Duquette, supra note 77, at 183 ("Joint actions will arise only where
there is a political will to do so.").
143. Bindi, supra note 94, at 35.
144. See SMITH, supra note 115, at 14 ("[Common strategies] list the Union's
goals vis-A-vis particular third countries and envisage the use of a wide
variety of different instruments .

.

. to achieve them.").

145. See Duquette, supra note 77, at 184 ("The [AT] does not, however,
specifically provide that common strategies shall commit the Member
States, which leaves the issue of their binding nature open to
interpretation.").
146. For a case study of the ineffectiveness of one common strategy, see
Claire Spencer, The EU and Common Strategies: The Revealing Case of
the Mediterranean,6 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 31, 48 (2001) ("The main
Strategy]
is
that
the
[Common
Mediterranean
weakness of
(paradoxically) it does not read as a 'strategy' at all . . . . [T]he

document does not establish a clear hierarchy of short, medium and
long-term objectives towards achieving [its goals].").
147. See Bindi, supra note 94, at 35 (noting that the use of common
strategies was "quickly dropped" because they "offered no real added
value" to common positions and joint actions).
148. See Spencer, supra note 146, at 51 ("The real problem, as ever, is that
unless one or more of the larger Member States champions the policy in
question, it is unlikely that anything of substance will occur as a result
of 'common strategies.').
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as the use of (or failure to use) unanimous voting impacts Member
States' ability to "trump" CFSP action in protection of their own
national interests. The CFSP's structure is also designed to allow
Member States to meet responsibilities under the CFSP while still
maintaining compliance with and meeting other treaty obligations."'
For instance, Article 47 of the TEU protects European Communities'
right of action where those rights overlap with aspects of CFSP."0
Article 42(2) of the TEU states that CFSP policies and decisions
must be in accord with NATO policy, and CFSP actions or policies
cannot interfere with Member States' obligations to NATO."' The
CFSP also realizes and embraces NATO's goals of expanding
membership east into the former Soviet bloc and preventing "the
development of gray areas and dividing lines."15 2 This may be a nod to
a European conception of perimeter security.
E. Enforcement Provisions

One of the areas where the CFSP is generally lacking is in the
enforcement mechanisms available to decision-makers to ensure
compliance with CFSP policies.' Article M of the TEU provides that
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) may review questions with
respect to the line between the EC Treaty and the CFSP.'54
Otherwise, the ECJ's role in CFSP actions is extremely limited.' 5
Thus the main enforcement mechanisms of CFSP decisions are

149. For instance, CFSP policies must be compatible with NATO policies
and CFSP actions cannot interfere with Member States' obligations to
NATO. See Duquette, supra note 77, at 177.
150. Id. at 175.
151. Id. at 177; BERMANN ET AL., supra note 92, at 1125; Treaty on European
Union, 7 February 1992, 1992 O.J. (C191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253.
152. Muschwig, supra note 4, at 39.
153. See PATRICIA MAGALHAES FERREIRA ET AL., EUR. CTR. FOR DEV. POLICY

MGMT., THE EU's COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY:
OPPORTUNITIES FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE EU RESPONSE TO CRISISAFFECTED COUNTRIES IN AFRICA 17 (2001) ("There are no provisions for
imposing penalties on EU Member States that do not live up to their
commitments . . .")

154. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 893-94 ("Article M [of the TEU] is
within the competence of the Court of Justice. Thus, questions with
respect to the line between the EC Treaty and CFSP are justiciable.");
Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, 1992 O.J. (C191)
I.L.M. 253.

1, 31

155. FERREIRA ET AL., supra note 154, at 17 ("[T]he European Court of
Justice [is not] allowed to make rulings in this area.").
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political pressure and treaty obligations under the TEU.'56 Where
these mechanisms prove ineffective, it is possible that pervasive public
opinion may be able to play a role in influencing decision-making and
enforcement.157
V.

UNITED STATES-CANADA

PERIMETER SECURITY

The proposed United States-Canada perimeter security plan has
attracted a number of critiques from voices on both sides of the
border. When applying the lessons learned from regional security
integration in the EU to address these concerns, it is important to
remember the nature of the United States-Canada situation. The long
history of cooperation between the countries and the unique
circumstances underlying the United States-Canada paradigm vis-hvis the EU model are of particular relevance.
On the Canadian side, the concerns over perimeter security echo
the worries voiced by critics as early as the Ogdensburg Agreement in
the 1940s. First, the critics worry that by ceding some measure of
security policy control to the United States, Canada is effectively
ceding sovereignty to the Americans." 8 Second, the critics claim that
any perimeter security plan will force increased security measures on
Canadian society, leading to Patriot Act-like domestic policies that
will chill Canadian civil liberties.159 Third, the critics argue that by
aligning itself ever more closely with the United States, Canada is
effectively doubling down on what looks like an increasingly unstable
bet due to American political strife and foreign policy

156. See Duquette, supra note 77, at 184 (acknowledging the importance of
political pressure and treaty obligations to enforcing CFSP decisions,
but "[admitting], however, there is no provision stating that legal action
can be taken against a Member State that does not comply with a
CFSP provision").
157. For the argument that public opinion will begin to play an important
role in European Union foreign policy decision-making and enforcement,
see Kai Oppermann & Alexander H6se, Public Opinion and the
Development of the European Security and Defence Policy, 12 EUR.
FOREIGN AFF. REV. 149 (2007).
158. See, e.g., Gabriel, supra note 6 ("The end results of a fully integrated
continental security perimeter could sacrifice what is left of Canadian
sovereignty and independence.").
159. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 73 ("The [perimeter security] deal could
trigger concerns over privacy and sharing of information with the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, but the [Beyond the Border]
statement says a deal would respect sovereignty, privacy and civil
liberties.")
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entanglements."'o Fourth, many Canadians are upset that the
negotiations on the perimeter security plan are being conducted in
private between the two governments, with little to no consultation
with the public."' Bearing those concerns in mind, there are a number
of lessons to be learned and applied from the experience of the EU.
In any successful security partnership, the parties must willingly
subordinate purely national interests to pursue the interests of the
partnership. A party pursuing national interests detracts from the
pursuit of the common interest.'6 Even if the party pursues a goal
consistent with the ultimate goals of the partnership, it is better to
have joint action pursued concurrently by all members than to
attempt to aggregate consistent unilateral actions."
In the same vein, it is important to balance and equalize the role
of each partner. One of the quickest ways to create controversy in a
partnership is if there is a perception that one of the parties has a
disproportionate influence on the partnership's decision-making." In
the EU this is a very complex issue due to the number of states
involved, but the United States-Canada security perimeter situation is
obviously only bilateral in nature. However, Canadians still worry
that any perimeter security plan would involve the United States
gaining unfair influence over Canadian policies.6
These concerns must be addressed by limiting the scope of any
plan to strictly areas of mutual concern. Such a narrowing of focus
could be beneficial overall: recall the comparison in Part IV-B
160. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 65 ("Things have reached the point
where Canadian policymakers and business are urgently rethinking the
country's economic strategy, which for decades has hinged on
maximizing trade south of the border.")
161. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 73 (noting critics' concerns that
perimeter security talks were being conducted in secret).
162. See GINSBERG, supra note 112, at 288 ("Member states recognize that
they can be more effective at less cost if they respond together to
influence international issues too large for any one of them to handle
well alone (concept of politics of scale).").
163. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 878 ("[T]he aggregate effort of the
Member States may be more effective than unilateral action of the
members, even when the unilateral actions are consistent with each
other.").
164. See, e.g., Muschwig, supra note 4, at 15 (noting the European Union's

goal to "adjust[] the predominance of the United States in the area of
military co-operation").
165. See, e.g., Gabriel, supra note 6 ("The end results of a fully integrated
continental security perimeter could sacrifice what is left of Canadian
sovereignty and independence. This could bring its military, security
and foreign policy under the umbrella of a single, U.S.-dominated North
American Command.").
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between NATO's narrow role and resulting cohesiveness relative to
the CFSP.' 66 Additionally, some of the pitfalls of regional integrations
mentioned in Part II could be alleviated by narrowing the scope and
focus of any U.S.-Canadian agreement. It is highly unlikely, if not
outright impossible, for the United Stated and Canada to create an
entirely supranational body to oversee perimeter security; therefore,
there should be no concerns with democratic deficit as there are in the
EU. Additionally, the EU's problems with transborder crime, illegal
immigration, and its ongoing fiscal crisis, can be avoided entirely by
limiting the focus of the perimeter security plan to strictly security
issues and avoiding over-enmeshment of each country's domestic
politics.
A. A New Agency?

The Action Plans released by the respective governments on
December 7, 2011 call for extensive coordination between various
agencies and departments of the two countries, as well as the creation
of various working groups.1 7 However, the myriad agencies involved
can lead to confusion and potentially a needless repetition of effort.
The December 7 Action Plans address this need for centralized
oversight by creating an "Executive Steering Committee," consisting
of officials from both countries who are tasked with overseeing
implementation of the Action Plan.'"
The Executive Steering
Committee is expected to release yearly reports on its progress.169
The Executive Steering Committee is a laudable recognition of
the need for centralized oversight, but it does not go far enough. The
most effective means of enacting any perimeter security agreement
would be the creation of a joint U.S.-Canadian agency charged with
overseeing the coordination of security perimeter policies. This new
agency could take a variety of forms. For one, the High
Representative/EEAS paradigm used by the EU7 0 can be easily
166. See generally GALLIS, supra note 123, at 5.
167. See Canadian December 7 Action Plan, supra note 60; United StatesCanada Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security
and Economic Competitiveness, GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES (Dec.

7, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/wh/us-canada-btb-actionplan.pdf [hereinafter American December 7 Action Plan] (U.S. version
of the Action Plan). Each country's version of the Action Plan is
essentially identical, so for the sake of simplicity all citations will be
made only to the American version.
168. American December 7 Action Plan, supra note 167, at 27 (noting that
the Executive Steering Committee will be made up of "Assistant
Secretary/Assistant Deputy Minister-level" officials).
169. Id.
170. See Cellerino, supra note 101, at 22.
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adapted to U.S.-Canadian purposes. The role of a powerful executive
figure is of particular importance. A unified executive is necessary in
order to present coherent external representation of the perimeter
security organization and its policies, and even more importantly to
ensure continuity of perimeter security policies and operations in the
face of rapidly changing American and Canadian political
landscapes."' This central executive could be appointed on a basis
similar to existing joint U.S.-Canadian commands such as NORAD.
In this manner a second-in-command of the opposite nationality
would counterbalance the power of the executive position in order to
preserve fairness to each country."'
If the United States and Canadian governments prove unwilling
to add or create a new agency or department charged with overseeing
perimeter security, there are a number of existing security forces
suitable for enforcing perimeter security policies. On an agency level,
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Canadian
Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (informally
known as Public Safety Canada) would be candidates to enforce
perimeter security programs."' On a more tactical, on-the-ground
level, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Border Patrol, and the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police would be likely candidates for this type of
role. Indeed, the December 7 Action Plans call for increased
cooperation between the Coast Guard and its Canadian
counterpart. 4 The Plans also call for two "Next-Generation"
programs to coordinate intelligence and criminal investigations and to
provide for an "intelligence-led uniformed presence" at points of entry;

171. See Muschwig, supra note 4, at 34 (noting the importance of the High
Representative to ensuring CFSP continuity due to the fact that the
Council Presidency of the European Union changes every six months).
172. Note, for example, the rotation of Canadian generals at NORAD
(including the deputy commander of NORAD, who is always Canadian)
acting as "assessors" who examine intelligence data to determine if
North America is under attack. See Joseph T. Jockel, Four U.S.
Military
Commands:
NORTHCOM,
NORAD,
SPA CECOM,
STRA TCOM - The Canadian Opportunity5 (Inst. for Research on Pub.
Pol'y, no. 2003-03), available at http://www.irpp.org/wp/archive/
wp2003-03.pdf ("The United States would trust the military of no other
ally in the assessor position, not even the British.").
173. The December 7 Action Plans call for comprehensive involvement of
these two agencies throughout the planning of perimeter security
policies, reflecting the capability of each to assert control over the full
panoply of perimeter security functions if need be. See American
December 7 Action Plan, supra note 167.
174. See id. at 21 (calling for "regularization" of the U.S-Canadian Shiprider
program).
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these Next-Generation programs are to be deployed in summer
2012."17
If the American and Canadian governments do not wish to add
another committee or agency to their already burgeoning
bureaucracies, there are a number of existing bodies that could be
repurposed for this role. For instance, the Permanent Joint Board on
Defence (PJBD), created by the Ogdensburg Agreement, could
assume responsibility for perimeter security policy-making. If an
existing body could not assume these responsibilities, the accumulated
institutional knowledge of those bodies could nevertheless be usefully
applied to the newly created perimeter security agency. For instance,
the PJBD's use of consensus in decision-making rather than strict
majority voting"' could be an effective basis for a new agency's
decision-making process.
Whatever form the perimeter security agency takes, it will be
crucial to manage the "capability-expectation gap.""' In essence, the
agency must be given the actual ability, physically and
administratively, to accomplish the tasks it is given. The initial
attempts at a EU CFSP were doubted because outside parties did not
believe the Union had given itself the means to achieve the lofty
objectives of the CFSP."1 The December 7 Action Plans' proposal for
an Executive Steering Committee is distressingly lacking in any
language granting the Committee actual power to achieve its
directive. Though the United States and Canada would likely face
domestic pressure to limit the power of an intergovernmental
perimeter security agency, it is essential that each government resist
these calls and cede to the agency the necessary power to accomplish
the goals that each country has for it. If nothing else, the Executive
Steering Committee should be given some measure of budgetary
control over the agencies it oversees so as to be able to exert real
pressure on them if necessary.
175. Id. (noting that the Next-Generation pilot programs are to integrate the
experience gained from Shiprider and the "best practices" from
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams and Border Enforcement Security
Task Forces).
176. See Keenleyside, supra note 45, at 54-55 ("Throughout [1940-451 no
decision was ever taken by a majority vote. Matters were discussed until
agreement was reached.").
177. For an in-depth examination of the capability-expectation gap, and the
argument that the gap is a result of inefficient CFSP decision-making
rather than lack of actual European Union capabilities, see Asle Toje,
The Consensus-Expectation Gap: Explaining Europe's Ineffective
Foreign Policy, 39 SECURITY DIALOGUE 121 (2008).

178. See Duquette, supra note 77, at 190-91 ("After the [TEU] introduced
the [CFSP], there was real concern as to whether the Union had the
capability to meet its intended goals.")
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B. Decision-Making Processes in the New Agency

Whatever organization is created or repurposed to oversee
perimeter security policy, the U.S. and Canadian governments would
do well to heed the lessons the CFSP provides in relation to collective
security decision-making. One way for negotiators to address
Canadian concerns would be to incorporate a highly streamlined and
(relatively) transparent decision-making process.
The United States-Canada perimeter security framework should
avoid the "too many cooks in the kitchen" problem of the CFSP and
limit perimeter security policy-making to the designated inter- or
supra-governmental agency. Given the bilateral nature of the
perimeter security plan, simple unanimous or qualified majority
voting will not work: either country would effectively have a veto
7
The
power over undesired actions or policies proposed by the other."'
most effective method for decision-making would be to create a
secretariat within the perimeter security organization. This group
would be made up by equal numbers of United States and Canadian
representatives, who would all have equal voting power. While it
could be argued that the representatives would only vote along
nationalistic lines, thus resulting in ties on every contentious vote, the
commanding executive of the perimeter security agency at that time
could serve as a tie-breaking vote if necessary.
An analogy could be drawn to the success of panels implemented
pursuant to Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"). These bodies are empanelled to adjudicate NAFTA
trade disputes outside the normal judicial process of the member
countries.so Annex 1901.2 of NAFTA provides a set of procedures for
the creation of a roster of qualified, unbiased candidates to serve on
NAFTA's bi-national panels.'"' While inevitably controversial at
times, the Chapter 19 panels have been a success8 2 and could serve as
a useful model for adjudicating perimeter security disputes.
179. See generally, Gabriel, supra note 6; See also, KAREN E. SMITH,
EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD 25 (2003)
("[T]he member states have sought to retain control over decisionmaking procedures, and have jealously guarded their own autonomy,
especially in the spheres of foreign and security policy . . . .").

180. See Eric J. Pan, Assessing the NVAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel
System: An Experiment in International Adjudication, 40 HARY. INT'L
L.J. 379, 382-83 (1999) (noting Chapter 19 panels' origins in Canadian
fears of "arbitrary administration of U.S. unfair trade laws").
181. North American Free Trade Agreement, Annex 1901.2, Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
182. See Pan, supra note 180, at 445-46 (concluding that the success of "the
Chapter 19 experiment demonstrates that international adjudication of
international issues can replace domestic adjudication and should be

expanded into other areas of law").
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The December 7 Action Plans only mention decision-making in
the context of border screening, saying that each country will
"maintain its right to independent decisionmaking [sic] and risk
assessment.""' This statement may be a warning sign that U.S. and
Canadian negotiators are reluctant to cede real decision-making power
to any centralized perimeter security agency. Such reluctance could
create problems for any perimeter security plans down the road: what
will happen when the United States or Canada decides to exercise its
independent decision-making power to enact a policy the other
country does not agree with?
It is important to note that concerns of unilateral national
interests trumping bilateral perimeter security interests may be much
ado over nothing anyway. H.L. Keenleyside, one of the original
Canadian members of the PJBD, reported that "one of the most
interesting and most gratifying features of the discussions within the
[PJBD] was the fact that divisions of opinion seldom occurred on
strictly national grounds."" More often, disagreements occurred on
the basis of service branch or civilian/military grounds."' It is possible
that if confronted with shared problems in the same manner the
PJBD was in Keenleyside's day, any joint U.S.-Canadian organization
could operate in a similarly nationality-neutral manner.' 6
C. Review and Enforcement Mechanism

Another crucial aspect of any successful United States-Canada
security partnership is a form of judicial review or accountability. As
mentioned above in Part IV-E, one of the main problems with the
EU's CFSP is that there is no effective method for requiring
compliance with CFSP policies other than reliance on political
pressure and treaty obligations. 8 1 In the bilateral United StatesCanada relationship, political pressure is unlikely to be sufficient to
change the mind of a recalcitrant partner.
Additionally, the creation of an effective mechanism for ensuring
accountability could ease Canadian concerns about erosion of civil
liberties and Canadian sovereignty. The December 7 Action Plans call
for a "joint statement of joint United States-Canada privacy
183. American December 7 Action Plan, supra note 167, at 8 ("The United
States and Canada do not intend to enforce each others' laws; instead,
the intent is to share information to enable each country to have better
information to enforce and administer its own laws.").
184. Keenleyside, supra note 45, at 55.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 50-77.
187. See FERREIRA ET AL., supra note 153, at 17 ("There are no provisions for
imposing penalties on EU Member States that do not live up to their
commitments . . .").
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principles" to be issued by May 30, 2012.'8 This statement is
intended to assuage Canadian fears of erosion of civil liberties, but
falls short of actually guaranteeing concrete protection of the privacy
principles to be expounded. A more tangible protection and
enforcement mechanism, as well as an avenue for relief in case of
violation, is needed.
The proposed enforcement mechanism could take a number of
forms. The United States and Canada have used the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ") to decide disputes in the past, such as in the
Gulf of Maine case.'" A similar ICJ special chamber could be formed
to deal with issues relating to the enforcement of perimeter-security
decisions. If a more expeditious dispute resolution procedure is
desired, the two countries could agree to simple arbitration to settle
any disputes. Each government could appoint an equal number of
representatives, and then those representatives could collectively elect
a perceived neutral party to serve as a tie-breaking vote if necessary.
As discussed above, bi-national committees organized along the lines
of NAFTA Chapter 19 could likely prove successful as well.
Whatever form the enforcement or review body takes, it is crucial
that the body operate as publicly as possible. By making its decisions
in public, to the extent possible while still observing national security
requirements, the mechanism could show citizens of each country that
their privacy interests are still being protected even as their security
is improved. 190

VI. CONCLUSION
The complexity of the EU is without parallel in terms of regional
integration."' The fact that a multinational body of the EU's
complexity has successfully managed to construct a coherent common
188. See American December 7 Plan, supra note 167, at 27.
189. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 130 (Oct.
12),
available at
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=3&code
=cigm&case=67&k=6f (Summary of the Judgment).

190. As noted above, transparency is one of the key concerns of Canadian
critics of the perimeter security plan. See, e.g., Dana Gabriel, CanadaU.S. Deep Integration: Establishing the Bi-National "Security
Perimeter",
GLOBAL
RESEARCH
(Mar.
31,
2011),

http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleld=24059 (noting
a recent poll result that 91% of Canadians "say the [perimeter security]
negotiations should take place in public so that [Canadians] can see
what is on the table").
191. See Muschwig, supra note 4, at 37 ("The economic and bureaucratic
complexity of integration of the European Union does not have a
counterpart within the areas of foreign and security policies.").
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foreign and security policy indicates that the United States and
Canada should be able to do the same. A United States-Canada
security perimeter can work, but the negotiators must be careful in
how they structure the resulting partnership. Weak or ineffective halfmeasures will meet neither country's goals, and could decrease rather
than increase each country's homeland security. Rather, the United
States and Canada should commit to a sensibly "broad, ambitious
and complex approach."' The two countries would do well to heed
the example of how the EU has shaped its common foreign and
security policy since the TEU. Specifically, the United States and
Canada should form an organization dedicated to overseeing the
common partnership policies, and to endow that organization with a
powerful executive and an effective implementing arm. The decisionmaking policies of the organization should be streamlined to the
maximum extent possible while still preserving the reserved national
security prerogatives of each country.
In order to alleviate concerns about erosion of civil liberties and
national sovereignty, negotiators should also strive to structure the
partnership so that a judicial body or arbitral group along the lines of
a Gulf of Maine tribunal or NAFTA Chapter 19 panel can review
decisions of the joint organization. By taking measures such as these,
the American and Canadian governments can ensure that any
resulting joint security partnership and security perimeter will be an
effective and sustainable national security measure, and a possible
precursor to further mutually beneficial integrations in the future.
Despite Carl Sandburg's admonition, 3 fences are coming down
between neighbors around the world. Removing the fence between the
United States and Canada, and relocating the fence-posts to the outer
perimeter of the two countries' border, is a worthy goal that will reap
large benefits for both countries.

192. Baliflo, supra note 3, at 547.
193. See Carl Sandburg Quotes, THINKExIST.cOM, http://thinkexist.com/
quotation/love-your neighbor as-yourself-but-dont-take/
175650.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
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